20c • APRIL 26, 1954

GOP Gimmicks for '54

New Republic



The Case of Oppenheimer



- What's Behind His Dismissal?
- Was Opposition to the H-Bomb Proof of Guilt?
- How Convincing is Evidence of His Disloyalty?

APR 22 1954
The Charles C. Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE COLLEGE
Johnson City, Tennessee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire T. R. B.

We got in late as Nixon was talking to the editors in the big Statler Hotel banquet room last week, ate our dessert first, tipped the waiter half a dollar to bring us back some excellent shad, and learned to our amazement that what the Vice-President was saying was "off the record." And what he was saying was sensational. It was, in brief, that the Eisenhower Administration thinks the loss of Indo-China would be so disastrous that the USA should fight alone—if necessary—to save it.

Nixon spoke gravely, carefully, in great detail for more than an hour, and the 1,000 or more editors and reporters sat enthralled as the young man, in his double-breasted dark suit, outlined the situation. France and Britain want to quit; the US is absolutely convinced this means Communist control, and that we can't afford it. There wasn't a doubt that Nixon was giving a calculated disclosure of Administration policy. The real stake in Indo-China, (as in Korea) Nixon said, is Japan. Japan has half the industrial potential of Russia herself. We can't afford to let Russia get Japan or to retreat further; we must send US troops, if necessary, to hold Indo-China. With startling frankness Nixon told a questioner in the audience that yes, maybe we had come away from Korea too soon; that "in hindsight" it might have been better to fight that war out to a victory rather than let Red China escape to mobilize its forces against Indo-China. (There was no reference to this answer in the *NY Times'* account of the story next day.) Nixon wound up by telling another questioner he thought Oppenheimer loyal though there was a *prima facie* security risk under existing law.

We haven't a doubt that the Administration knew Nixon's name would soon be connected to this Indo-Chinese trial balloon. What we read in the affair is that the Administration is now deeply concerned, and is trying to tell the country so. Incidentally, it is telling London, Paris and Moscow that it means business. It is a tough task because it is one of the greatest political reversals in a lifetime. Ike won election on the "no more Korea's" issue; his Administration has spent 15 months pompously trying to argue it has a different foreign policy from that of Truman-Acheson; it has cut army strength and pretended that A-bomb "instant retaliation" would end little wars. As recently as March 15, Nixon himself, in a pretentious answer to Adlai Stevenson, accused Democrats of falling into the Communist trap "to destroy us by drawing us into little wars all over the world with their satellites, where they themselves were not involved."

Nixon (who now says we left Korea too soon) challenged Stevenson, March 15—"Does he think the Korean War should not have been stopped?"

The Administration's reversal is breath-taking. Only a very grave danger, we think, could cause politicians to eat words like this. The political implications are incalculable. Ike built his 1952 campaign on the charge Democrats "blundered" into Korea, that he would end Korea and, as President "would eliminate the chances of a new Korea" (Joliet, 9/15/52) . . . Ike deserves patriotic support if the situation is as bad as this, but what a way to get it! The public has been lulled by huckster sloganeering, and Democratic legislators—who now as always will be the backbone of internationalist support—have been snubbed, misrepresented and reviled with charges of "Twenty Years of Treason." In the old days under FDR and Truman there were Republicans in the government's top defense echelons—Stimson, Knox, and Dulles himself. Ike doesn't let a Democrat get near his team.

Ike ordered a "blank wall" for Dr. Robert Oppenheimer on atomic secrets —which is about like telling Einstein he can't have a physics book. Oppenheimer admittedly knew Communists in the mid-thirties, repented and then more than any one man was responsible for giving the US the conquering A-bomb. Under the Truman security program Oppenheimer was okay; but under the Eisenhower program of May 27, 1953, he must be tested as a security risk in order to head off McCarthy. Oppenheimer in 1947—unanimously supported by the General Advisory Committee and a majority of the Atomic Energy Commission—opposed the "crash program" of making the H-bomb. When Truman said "Go ahead," evidence indicates Oppenheimer loyally carried out the order. One of the minority of two who favored the crash program was Lewis L. Strauss. Strauss was delegated to tell Oppenheimer that he must face security charges —or resign quietly. If he had resigned, he would have been a sitting duck for McCarthy's later attack on grounds that silence indicated guilt. To us the Oppenheimer case is the ultimate insanity of the nightmare Eisenhower security order. Under the logic of hundreds of earlier cruel dismissals how can the Administration keep Oppenheimer? It's just as Defense Secretary Wilson told a press conference. He wouldn't use Oppenheimer now, he says, regardless of the outcome; maybe Oppenheimer has reformed, but he once played with Commies, didn't he? Somehow our outrage at this affair gets confused with our admiration for the hideous logic of the plot in the drama. At the Nuremberg trials Reich Minister Albert Speer told prosecutor Robert Jackson that Germany suffered irreparable delay in atomic development "because unfortunately our best experts had gone to America."

"The policy of driving people out who didn't agree with Germany," said Jackson, "hasn't produced very good dividends, has it?"

"That, as far as we were concerned, had a very decisive disadvantage particularly in this sector," answered Speer.

"Drive them out!" says Wilson.

Notes: The *US News & World Report* published by McCarthy-apologist David Lawrence has a feature telling how FDR "plotted" Pearl Harbor; next week they are telling how Abe Lincoln arranged the attack on Fort Sumter. . . . There's still no conclusive evidence the economy's drift downward is halting; statistics indicate a huge buyers' strike underway with consumers holding back money for expected lower prices. . . . It was the prominent local citizens of your communities who made the killing in the FHA scandals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

The Editor's Barometer

EDITORS of many influential Republican dailies gathered for the American Society of Newspaper Editors' annual meeting in Washington privately agreed that present prospects for the GOP in November are not good. Unemployment, and fear of more of it, transcends every other issue in every region, the editors reported. US entry into war in Indo-China would be very unpopular with the great majority of voters, regardless of the issues involved, several shrewd Republican editors predicted. On this account, they felt even a shift back to heavy war production—and new hirings—in the autumn would not automatically produce Republican victory in the elections. If unemployment remains above 3.5 million, key editors stated, the Democrats will have a strong chance to take the Senate as well as the House.

Economic indicators made public while the editors were in Washington showed no change for the better. President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisors' monthly report showed industrial production off 3.3 percent since June, 1953. Railroad employment, always a good barometer was down on March 15 by 10.9 percent from the same date last year; car loadings declined 16 percent during the same period.

Housing Frauds

ECONOMISTS in the present Administration agreed with New Dealers that the housing industry is a keystone of the national economy, and government aids a mainstay of the industry. That aid takes three major forms: loan-guarantees for the private builder who meets certain requirements; assistance to communities for public housing and slum clearance; and research. The abuses currently in the news of Title I and Section 608 of the National Housing Act—amounting, says Housing Administrator Albert Cole, to at least 251 cases and $75 million—all involve aid to the private builder. The men concerned exploited the government's efforts to provide housing for defense workers and veterans, and to prevent the growth of slums, through guaranteed loans for apartment-house construction and home repairs. The abuses occurred under both Democratic and GOP Administrations.

But now that public attention has finally been focused on these wrong-doings, the financial trade press and some newspaper chains are trying to use the exposure as a springboard for an attack upon all government housing activities. The argument goes like this: since some private builders sought and found ways to exploit for private profit the government's efforts to aid their industry, obviously the government should pull out of housing altogether—its presence encourages corruption. "You, sir, are a villain! By lending me money I badly want, you invite me to steal from you."

Another example of this kind of thinking is the position taken by Albert Cole, chief of all government housing operations and the man conducting the Administration's investigation. Cole disapproves of the actual frauds. But he endorses the attitude basic to them. In a statement reminiscent of Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks' "play of the market place" approach to the AD-X2 controversy, Cole says that of course the builder "had a right to outguess" the government if he could.

Who Picks Up the Tab?

THE BILL for McCarthy's filmed attack on Edward R. Murrow—shown by Murrow on *See It Now* as McCarthy's rebuttal to a previous program—so far has been sent by the movie studio which made it, Fox Movietone, to McCarthy; by McCarthy to the Aluminum Company of America, Murrow's sponsor; and by Alcoa to the Columbia Broadcasting System, producers of the show. No indication yet of where it will eventually end up. Murrow says he "certainly won't pay for it." McCarthy seems determined not to either. So . . .?

McCarthy was invited on *See It Now* on the assumption that he would appear "live" or use CBS facilities. Instead, McCarthy went to a commercial studio and spent some $7,000 of someone's (whose?) money.

In the meantime, the management of Alcoa, somewhat jittery over all the controversy, seems to be holding firm. "We have no thought that Mr. Murrow is a Communist," says Arthur V. Davis, Chairman of the board. Actually, the company's officers have received "extremely favorable reaction from dealers and suppliers," and that they like.

Another consequence: some 12 stations which did not carry the original Murrow show on McCarthy have been forced by public demand to buy a film of it for presentation to their local audience.

Is Secretary Benson Right?

DEBATE is beginning in Congress on the Administration's farm program. It centers on the dispute between advocates of rigid price supports and Secretary Benson's recommendation for a flexible price-support system. Next week in the *New Republic,* Henry A. Wallace, originator of the Ever-Normal Granary Program and the present soil conservation program, will argue that only a flexible price-support policy can save these basic programs. Breaking sharply with the position of some farm leaders, Mr. Wallace states:

"I have no interest in partisan politics. I am not supporting or criticizing the approach of any party. But I am enormously interested in seeing that the farmers use their land, their efforts and their dollars to produce the most for themselves and the world of those things which the world most needs."

Read this important contribution to independent thinking in next week's *New Republic.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Virtue Triumphant

WHILE the annual conventions of the American Newspaper Publishers Association are characterized by lavish dinners and entertainments paid for by paper-manufacturers and such folk, the American Association of Newspaper Editors has traditionally devoted its four-day annual meetings in Washington to the serious business of trying to find out just what is going on in the minds of our leaders. Consider their astonishment when they arrived this year and found that they were to be entertained on successive evenings by General Motors and the Ford Motor Company.

On the first evening they were met at the door by none other than Harlow Curtice, the President of General Motors, himself, who, after pumping their arms urged them toward the tastiest collections of lobsters, lobbyists, liquors and wines gathered together in Washington in a long, long time. The following evening was a duplicate, as similar as Ford's "Full-Circle Visibility" to GM's "Panoramic View"—except that the editors received a Ford keepsake to add to the plastic miniature Buicks they had been given the night before.

The editors who read the *Wall Street Journal* the next morning learned that while the GM party was going on the Justice Department had announced an investigation of General Motors and Ford to determine "whether they may or may not be moving toward a monopoly position in the industry."

A check established that this year's "program chairman," Michael Gorman, who had sanctioned the two dinners, is editor of the Flint, Michigan, *Journal.* Flint, of course, is the home of large General Motors and Ford plants.

The editors, we are proud to report, did not succumb to the lure of free loading. They left Washington resolved to prevent such goings on in the future, and to avoid choosing as "program chairmen" men torn between respect for tradition and loyalty to the home town.

Of Dogs and Duels

SENATOR MCCARTHY has occasionally been likened to John Randolph of Roanoke, a man who dominated Congress for a few years in the early Nineteenth Century until his own conduct destroyed him. Randolph was infinitely superior to McCarthy in intellect, education and oratorical ability, and his personal financial affairs were above reproach. He was the spiritual godfather of the Wisconsin demagogue in his addiction to reckless attacks for political purposes. He too capitalized on accusations that the American government, controlled by his own party, was full of agents for a would-be world conqueror: Napoleon and the Jacobin imperialists. The effect then was the same as now—to help instead of hurt the dictator by encouraging American disunity.

What has not been noted is the identical progress of Randolph and McCarthy in their relations with Congress. The Wisconsin Senator seems to be approaching the situation in which Randolph found himself in November, 1811. For two years Randolph had been taking his seat in the House of Representatives accompanied by an enormous she-dog, which ran up and down the aisles knocking Congressmen down. Speaker Macon was personally devoted to Randolph and said nothing. Most members didn't dare force a showdown because they dreaded Randolph's scathing, whiplash tongue—some because he was always practicing with a pistol and threatening to challenge his Congressional adversaries.

For a whole session this went on and then, in the fall of 1811, the House elected a first-term member, Henry Clay, as its speaker. The first time Randolph brought his dog into the chamber, Clay ordered the doorkeeper to remove it. The brute was never seen on the floor again. Randolph said not one word. Why? Randolph talked incessantly about duels. Clay was from Kentucky.

Hunt & Mutual

MCCARTHY's financial backer, Texas oilman H. L. Hunt, has bought for his *Facts Forum* organization Mutual Broadcasting System's "State of the Union" and "Reporters' Roundup." And Mutual's top "news commentator," Fulton Lewis Jr., is said to be Hunt's principal advisor on radio and television affairs. So when Tom O'Neil, President and Chairman of the Board of the General Teleradio Company—largest stockholder in MBS and owned in turn by General Tire Company—began streamlining MBS in a way which would make it more attractive to a potential buyer, Hunt seemed the likeliest prospect.

But after a week of open speculation by the trade papers, Tom O'Neil branded the report "fantastic . . . should be consigned to the oblivion it so richly deserves." It is an open secret, however, that O'Neil would like to dump MBS and start a chain of new Ultra High Frequency television stations. And it is doubtful if he'll succeed in halting rumors of an impending sale to Hunt as long as he and Fulton Lewis Jr. continue commuting between Washington, D.C. and Dallas, Texas.

New Republic A JOURNAL OF OPINION

VOLUME 130, NUMBER 17, ISSUE 2057

Michael Straight, *Editor*
Gilbert A. Harrison, *Publisher*
Helen Fuller, *Managing Editor*
Allan E. Aird, *Business Manager*

Tom Fitzsimmons, *Staff Writer*
F. R. Ruskin, *Administrative Assistant*
Eric Bentley, *Theatre Critic*
Robert Evett, *Book Editor*
Lucille Davis, *Copy Assistant*

Contributing Critics: W. H. Auden, Bruce Bliven, Dudley Fitts, Joseph Frank, Gerald W. Johnson, V. O. Key Jr., Max Lerner, Richard Lester, Arthur Mizener, James R. Newman, Kathleen Raine, John Crowe Ransom, Herbert Read, Robert Richman, Mark Schorer, Stephen Spender, Allen Tate

THIS ISSUE

Washington Wire, by T.R.B..... 2
Behind the Headlines 3
Operation Huckster 5
by Tom Fitzsimmons
The Case of Robert Oppenheimer.... 8
The Superficial Aspect 16
by Gerald W. Johnson
Secret Prelude to Geneva 17
by Frank Gorrell
Books and Comment 18
Correspondence 23

Published weekly and Copyrighted, 1954 in the USA by New Republic, Inc., publishing office, 301 N. St., N.E., Washington 2, D.C. Editorial and business communications should be addressed to 1826 Jefferson Place, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950 at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 20c; Yearly subscription, $7.00; Foreign, $8.00; Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While You Weren't Looking

Operation Huckster

Republicans plan "the biggest off-year campaign in history"—with the ad-men in charge.

by Tom Fitzsimmons

OPERATION Huckster opens this year. For the first time, central control over a nationwide political campaign has been given over to the advertising agencies. Republican candidates will be "merchandized." And although the Republican National Committee campaign budget has been given as $3,800,000, executives of Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn, advertising; and Whitaker and Baxter, the Carl Byoir, and the Steve Hannegan public-relations firms, are assuming that they can spend up to $10 million to do the job. Women will not only be appealed to, but used on an unprecedented scale. While the Democrats—poor by comparison—try to lure the public to political meetings in hundreds of Congressional districts, the Republicans will use the ladies to get their message to "where the folks are"—the home.

One of the constant, solution-defying problems of politicking is how to use all those inexperienced volunteers who offer their services in a moment of enthusiasm, then get bored—if not plain mad—as the weeks go by and they are offered no more interesting jobs than stamp-licking. A former *Newsweek* editor, Robert Humphrey, has long thought that the answer lay in a simple gadget used by traveling salesmen as far back as 1938. Humphrey now is Republican campaign director. And the gadget—tested in 1950 and 1952—promises to be the Republican "secret weapon" this year.

A few weeks ago, 1,390 Republican ladies came to Washington from all over the US for a "Centennial Conference" which was really a co-ordinating conference for the coming campaign. All the ladies were leaders of Republican Women's Clubs, and they attended workshops on how to organize the girls back home into an effective political force. They were enthusiastic about almost everything, but they were most enthusiastic about a neat little 14 pound leatherette case—which any of them could carry without disturbing the set of her dress—containing a 35mm film projector, a turntable for long-playing records and a loudspeaker. Given five minutes instruction and a roll of film which fits into a purse, the most politically inexperienced gal in the block leaves campaign headquarters ready and able to conduct a successful political meeting—in her own living-room, over coffee, for a small, intimate group. ("In the poorer districts," say the Republicans, "we'll supply the coffee.")

Consider the effect: the intimate surroundings, the eagerness to appear knowing, a political message not delivered to the ear alone, but dramatically and entertainingly to the eye as well. ("The audience sits transfixed," says a Republican training-film describing itself, "almost hypnotized by this double onslaught—and they are convinced.") There is no rebuttal. Then, soon after the film ends, there is a ring at the door and the man on the screen—the local candidate—arrives to shake hands and exchange smiles with the ladies. Five minutes later he is gone, on his way to meet another neighborhood group. His knottiest problem, how to find time to meet many constituents face to face and also address them seriously and convincingly, is largely solved. And the financial burden on him is significantly eased. Films—both standard presentations on national issues and one or two tailor-made for him—are provided free by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee. The projectors? His organization has a few, many of the women's husbands own one, there is likely to be a sympathetic local firm which has several, and a recent survey indicates that in every town of more than 800 population a projector is available for a nominal rental.

In addition to these "coffee hours" in the home, Republicans have found that their "secret weapon" allows them to track down the independent voter—who won't come to a typical political meeting—no matter where he hides. The ladies tote their little machines into service clubs, women's clubs, civic organization meetings, libraries and even churches—"places" as one Republican put it, "we never thought we could reach with a political message." Even the innocent pedestrian will not be safe from this gadget. Detailed instructions on how to transform the show-window of an empty store into a movie screen—by pasting white paper all over it and projecting a reversed image upon the paper from the interior—were given all the girls convened in Washington.

The ladies at the "Centennial Conference"—they really fell for the little machine—got quite excited about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

something else too: one of the films which will be made available to them, "The Case of Harry Dexter White." This is essentially a series of film-clips from newsreels of Harry Truman's television answer to the charge that he had "knowingly promoted" a Communist spy, and of the testimony later given the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee by Attorney General Herbert Brownell and FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover. The clips are juxtaposed so that Brownell and Hoover seem to be answering specific points in Truman's speech, and the whole is sandwiched between scenes in which Rep. C. B. Brownson (R, Ind.)—a personable man—explains from his desk how this film was made to "get the facts to the folks." The whole has the aspect of a documentary film and is terrifically effective—Truman is made to appear a foolish man determined to save face at any cost. To get this effect all anyone needs is a pair of scissors and some glue. You take a strip of film on which Truman makes a statement, you find another on which Brownell or Hoover makes a statement which, if cut at just the right place and lifted from context, seems a flat contradiction of Truman's, and you glue them together. Only a very intent viewer, and one who has carefully studied the record involved, is able to discern that only the most tenuous relation exists between the two statements, that the seemingly contradictory statement is not really to the point, and that this would be made obvious by the next sentence. But the next sentence never comes. Once again Truman is on the screen, then Brownell or Hoover and the whole process is repeated—most effectively. This technique can, of course, be applied by anyone to any event recorded on film in effect to rewrite history. Think of what McCarthy could do to the Army-Cohn-Schine hearings whatever their outcome, or, if public hearings should be held, to the Oppenheimer case. Any speech filmed by newsreel cameras can be doctored. Lift a sentence here, another there, join them and you can make a man say whatever you wish—the only limit would be the limit of your boldness and the degree to which the public mind has been made willing to believe your thesis, a willingness which would grow with each success.

Humphrey was careful in introducing the ladies at the Conference to "The Case of Harry Dexter White" to state that the film had not been made by, nor would it be distributed by, the Republican National Committee. He gave Rep. Brownson all the "credit." Facts are that all the editing was done by an employee of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee and that it will be available for rent to the ladies at $28 per print if they care to invest in 16mm movie equipment.

There are other films, for which the National Committee does take "credit," already made and in the making. Some were tried out in the 1952 campaign: *Korea*—"the 5-year record of appeasement . . . dating from Yalta and culminating in . . . Korea"; *America's Creeping Socialism*—"how Marxism . . . has infiltrated our country and weakened the Democratic Party until today it advocates a socialistic program"; *The Brannan Plan*—"a cartoon presentation. . . . Farm experts call this presentation 'devastating'." These are in color and will be used again this year—although the present Administration's increasing involvement in the Indo-China War, its continuation of so many "socialistic" programs initiated by the Democrats, and its Brannan Plan for wool, suggests that their usefulness may be limited. Others are in the works, and the favorable reception of "The Case of Harry Dexter White" by the ladies has encouraged the National Committee to be bold. For raw material it has at its disposal the film libraries of major motion picture companies.

These films are not primarily designed for use in the home. They will be used on local television broadcasts in a "saturation" campaign designed to overwhelm the opposition during the closing days of the campaign after the ladies have prepared the ground. The plan is magnificently expensive, but simple. Large packages of time will be bought from local television stations in low-cost areas and from the new Ultra High Frequency stations which sell time more cheaply. Dozens of half-hour segments of time will be bought to show films like "The Case of Harry Dexter White" many times a day during the weeks just before election. Spotted properly,

The kind of "facts" the GOP is "getting to the folks"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at least one film will reach most viewers in the area. As for cost, since the arrangements with the local stations will be made by the advertising men who control so many of the soap, cigarette, gasoline, etc., accounts upon which the stations depend for their existence, advantageous arrangements as to price will probably be worked out. There are some 280 television "markets" (areas) comprising 32 million homes in this country today. Campaign director Humphrey has promised that he will use at least 190 of these in "the biggest off-year election campaign in the nation's history."

That campaign of course is not going to be conducted entirely by means of TV saturation, "doctored-documentaries" and 35mm projectors. All the usual precinct chore-work will be done. But this too will be directed by the advertising men and here too they have turned to their natural allies the ladies. Tidy, colorful, "attractively packaged" books of instructions—in which the word "leader" appears always and only in bold, black type—have been distributed to the women's clubs. Life-size posters are available, showing President Eisenhower leaning on the shoulder of a smartly-tailored, "average" woman triumphantly labeled "the precinct worker." For women, political work is to be the "latest thing," and definitely "chic." Morning coffee hours are to be *de rigeur* (a Republican survey fixed the American housewife's freest hours: 10 to 11:30 a.m.). Innocent neighbors are to be invited and their politics tactfully plumbed. Good but ignorant Republicans will be passed on to other morning meetings where experts will coax them into and prepare them for precinct work (and the weight of "Ike" on their slender shoulders). Others are to be educated if possible: no arguments, the instructions insist, the "let's talk about it" approach is the only proper one, and "let's talk about it" cards containing precise, clipped Republican answers to all political questions are available for $6 a thousand.

Next to femininity, the accent is on youth. President Eisenhower's statement that 18-year-olds are old enough to vote will be "merchandized" to the hilt. The Young Republican Clubs all have set up "First Voters Committees" which search high-school year-books and other such sources for likely-looking youngsters. Once selected, these are invited to barbecues, dances, picnics and what-all—where occasionally a young, attractive local political personality (Republican) appears to shake their hands and overwhelm them—until they understand beyond the shadow of a doubt which party is on the side of "Youth."

A Young Republican Campus Program also has been launched to which the advertising men have contributed slogans like "College Clubs are the West Points of Politics" where you can get "political *savoir-faire*," and devices like "official fighting elephant emblems and pins": tie bars, tie chains, cuff-links, bracelet charms and earrings all flaunting a green pugilistic elephant. Young Republicans will, of course, also show films—at the drop of a hat.

Then there are the "Citizens for Eisenhower" who have now become "Citizens for Republicans." Originally dedicated to a political idea they believed "Ike" would serve, they have talked themselves into thinking that regardless of which individual might support "Ike" on key issues, any Republican is better than any Democrat. They will also look to Madison Avenue for direction.

As for the candidate himself, he too will be well supplied. The Republican Congressional Campaign Committee has arranged to allow each Republican Congressman to make one or two films particularly aimed at his own area. He may call upon the services of artists, photographers, ghost-writers and ad-men—all for free. He will be supplied with news-releases, mats for political newspaper ads (with a space for his photograph), headlines for news-letters, and a complete speech kit containing speeches on all major issues, "quotable quotes" and "speech quips of a humorous nature." (This year the item "numerous short, pungent examples of government waste" has been dispensed with.) And he may participate in filmed TV shows. In addition to the "television saturation" campaign, the National Committee is preparing many one-, two-, five- and 15-minute radio shows as well as one- and two-minute television "spots" for national use. (Remember?—"*Voice*: Mr. Eisenhower, what about the high cost of living? *Eisenhower*: Mamie worries about the same thing. I tell her it's our job to change that on November 4.")

And what of the Democrats? At the moment they have to count every penny. There will be no "secret weapon," no "saturation," and very few "services" or Madison Avenue consultants. In their plight they are trying to convince themselves that while the Republicans "go to the folks" they can bring the folks to them in the usual political meetings. They talk about "an old-fashioned" campaign and seem not to realize just how "old-fashioned" it will be. Their rosiest dreams involve the making of one, maybe two, films for television use—five and 15 minutes—and possibly a few one-minute "spot" films. They hope to provide some women with recordings of speeches for "coffee-hour" use.

After the 1952 Republican victory, the editor of *Tide*, an advertising and sales trade publication, announced "Advertising . . . demonstrated beyond question that it can sell a good idea as successfully as it can sell a good product." He didn't mention that it can do the same for a *bad* idea. Or that unless there is competition—the equal prominence of a good idea, or product, for purposes of comparison—the idea being advertised is likely to be put over solidly, and the methods of doing it made respectable by success, no matter how bad it might be. Competition in ideas is liable to be pretty weak this year—about of the order of a one-shot derringer pistol versus a Buck Rogers death-ray gun. If that disproportion is allowed to persist into 1956, the consequences may well be drastic, for Democrats at the very least.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Case of Robert Oppenheimer

Are his past political views and opposition to H-bombs proof of present disloyalty? The fate of more than one man's at issue.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER is well aware of the vital and growing role of science in protecting the peace and security of the United States and the free world. In a special message to the Congress, on April 30, 1953, President Eisenhower stated:

> Only by including outstanding civilian experts in the process of strategic planning can our military services bring new weapons rapidly into their established weapons systems, make recommendations with respect to the use of new systems of weapons in the future war plans, and see that the whole range of scientific information and knowledge of fundamental cost factors are taken into account in strategic planning.

Presumably this realm of science and war is important to the United States. If there is one outstanding civilian expert in the realm, it is Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. When President Eisenhower suspended Dr. Oppenheimer as a security risk, when he raised a "blank wall" between Oppenheimer and the government he had guided for 12 years, he himself took the gravest risks with our security. Only the self-denial of Dr. Oppenheimer, and the self-restraint of the scientific community can prevent the President's action from weakening the future security of the United States.

Why the President Acted

Dr. Oppenheimer was first summoned to government service in the Spring of 1942. He was asked then to give up his teaching post at the California Institute of Technology, and to take charge of a number of scattered experimental projects concerned with the feasibility of atomic weapons. At that time his political associations and sympathies as a California research professor were made known to his superiors and their security chiefs. And, despite them, Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared for secret work in the Metallurgical Laboratory. He was cleared again by General Leslie Groves, Chief of the Manhattan Engineering Project, and his deputy Kenneth D. Nichols, and so he was assigned to lead the most dangerous and secret project ever undertaken by the government of the United States. When that project was completed, and the war was won, Dr. Oppenheimer's prewar record of sympathy for Communist causes was reviewed again. President Truman's Loyalty Order was rigidly applied in the newly organized Atomic Energy Commission in 1947. There Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared again for secret work and the men who cleared him included General Nichols and a Commissioner, Admiral Lewis Strauss. While Oppenheimer returned to his university career he continued to consult with the government, and to be given classified data. So his loyalty was constantly reviewed and reaffirmed.

In 1953, however, two events took place. President Eisenhower issued a new standard for judging loyalty, and Admiral Strauss became Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. With these events, the trial of Dr. Oppenheimer began.

On May 28, 1953, President Eisenhower, by Executive Order 10450, extended the application of the summary dismissal statute to all agencies and positions in the federal service. He cancelled President Truman's Loyalty Order, and he abolished all agency loyalty boards. He issued a new Order and with it, new standards of security.

The new Order followed the assertion, voiced by the Republican Party and accepted by a majority of the electorate, that President Truman's Loyalty Order was too soft on Communists and Communist sympathizers in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"beyond a reasonable doubt," President Truman had substituted the standard of "reasonable doubt" in determining a man's fitness to work for the government. In turn President Eisenhower demolished the Truman standard, and established the standard "no shadow of a doubt." At the same time he lowered the standards of evidence which could be construed as raising doubts of a citizen's loyalty to his country.

Under the Truman Loyalty Order, membership in an organization judged to be subversive was treated as one piece of evidence, to be weighed against other favorable evidence, and to be judged in terms of the time and duration of membership in the organization and the citizen's knowledge of its true purposes.

The new Order revised these standards and added additional tests of a man's security. They emphasized liability to coercion, association with subversive individuals, and personal habits. And they included the following tests:

"Any behavior, activities or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy."

With standards as vague as this to guide him, each agency head was charged by President Eisenhower with full responsibility. The burden of proof was shifted from the obligation of demonstrating insecurity to the necessity of proving full security. Agency heads were charged with ensuring that the employment of each public servant was "clearly consistent with the national security." So the days were reenacted in which King Rehoboam rejected the pleas of the Israelites who pleaded with him to lighten the burdens which his father, King Solomon had placed upon them.

"My father made your yoke heavy and I will add to your yoke; my father also chastized you with whips, but I will chastize you with scorpions."

Gordon Clapp was said to be "unemployable" as head of the TVA. Mrs. Mildred McAfee Horton, former head of the WAVES, was assumed to be a security risk. Judge Learned Hand was taken to be a subversive author whose works should not be in our overseas libraries. And in the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Strauss concluded that Dr. Oppenheimer's access to classified data jeopardized the security of the United States.

Admiral Strauss became Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on July 3, 1953. On July 7 the Commission, at Strauss' insistence, seized all classified documents in Dr. Oppenheimer's study at the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton and placed them elsewhere. At that moment, Dr. Oppenheimer's file had not even been reviewed in the light of the President's new Order. When a "preliminary review" was completed, Strauss went to the White House and the President (in the words of an Atomic Energy Commission release of April 13) "directed that pending a security review of the material in the file a blank wall be placed between Dr. Oppenheimer and any secret data." With no more than this preliminary review to go on, and without granting Dr. Oppenheimer the opportunity to be heard in his own defense, President Eisenhower and Admiral Strauss cancelled his "Q" clearance, blocked his access to classified documents, and cancelled his membership on the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Explaining the "philosophy" of this action Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson who participated in the decision stated that he saw no reason why crooks should be reformed at government expense.

At Princeton, Dr. Oppenheimer had no knowledge of these developments. On December 21 he paid a casual courtesy call on his friend, Admiral Strauss. He was informed by the Admiral that he had 24 hours to resign all connections with the government or else face charges including the charge of disloyalty. Shaken, Dr. Oppenheimer returned to his Princeton study. There General Nichols telephoned him the following morning to say that unless he resigned at once, an agent of the Commission would serve charges on him that afternoon. Dr. Oppenheimer chose, of course, to face the charges so suddenly hurled against him. So the letter of December 23 was sent.

The letter was signed by Dr. Oppenheimer's old associate, Kenneth Nichols. It contained many well-worn allegations and one new allegation against Dr. Oppenheimer. And it placed upon him the task of proving his innocence. The letter stated:

> In view of your access to highly sensitive classified information and in view of these allegations which, until disproved raise questions as to your veracity, conduct and even your loyalty, the Commission has no other recourse in the discharge of its obligations to protect the common defense and security but to suspend your clearance until the matter has been resolved.

The Charges and the Replies

The December 23 letter to Dr. Oppenheimer lists "the substance of the information which raises the question of your eligibility for employment on Atomic Energy Commission work." They fall first in this group:

Prewar membership in three organizations *later* cited as Communist fronts;

Prewar association with members of the Communist Party, including Dr. Oppenheimer's brother, his brother's wife, his own wife, and a woman he once planned to marry;

Financial support of Communist-sponsored causes, given through a functionary up to April, 1942;

Prewar and postwar attendance at closed meetings of the Communist Party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Who's being walled off from what?

All these charges save the last were freely conceded to be true by Dr. Oppenheimer when he first joined the government. The last charge he denied. "I might well have appeared at the time as quite close to the Communist Party—perhaps even to some people as belonging to it . . . some of its declared objectives seemed to me desirable. But I never was a member of the Communist Party. I never accepted Communist dogma or theory; . . . in most cases I did not in those days know who was and who was not a member of the Communist Party."

To this defense the accusers of Dr. Oppenheimer have a reply, plainly inferred in the letter from the Atomic Energy Commission. If Dr. Oppenheimer didn't belong openly to the Communist Party, it was because he was a secret member; if he broke with his Communist friends and sympathizers, the break was engineered so that he might better serve the party underground. If he served his country brilliantly, this was so that he might betray it, even more brilliantly later on.

By this standard, a man's entire outward conduct over the best years of his life can be discarded as irrelevant or at least unconvincing. And so, by the same standard it is possible to argue that Secretary Dulles, President Eisenhower or any man who has associated at any time with Communists or Russians and expressed sympathy for them is in fact a Communist sympathizer, awaiting the decisive moment. Those charged with responsibility for the nation's security can only be governed by reason as they weigh the persuasiveness of the charges against the persuasiveness of the defense.

The Charges. As in all loyalty cases, the accusers of Dr. Oppenheimer are faceless and nameless. Each paragraph begins "it was reported. . . . " By whom, Dr. Oppenheimer is not to know.

The central charge, that Dr. Oppenheimer was a secret Communist who went underground in 1942, is linked to the names of seven suspected Communists. These seven, the Atomic Energy Commission charges:

> *Are reported* to have made statements *indicating* that you were a member of the Communist Party . . . that your name shall be removed from the party mailing list and not mentioned in any way; that you had talked the atomic bomb question out with party members during this period and that *several years prior to 1945* you had told Steve Nelson that the Army was working on an atomic bomb. (Italics ours.)

The significance of this damaging paragraph turns in part on who "reported" these statements; and on what "indicating" means. The last statement is inherently improbable since the Army commenced work on the bomb not "several" but three years prior to 1945. Of the seven witnesses whose indications are cited as hearsay evidence Dr. Oppenheimer dismisses five as casual acquaintances or persons unknown to him. One of the remainder is Steve Nelson, a Communist organizer who befriended his wife after the death of her first husband in the Spanish Civil War. The second is Dr. Hannah Peters, organizer of the Professional Section of the Communist Party of Alameda County, California, and a logical contact about whom nothing is said by Dr. Oppenheimer.

At this point it should be conceded that membership or non-membership in the Communist Party was a technicality. It bears on Dr. Oppenheimer's veracity if he denies it while others affirm it, and this in turn must be weighed by the Gray board since the withholding of any information is listed by the Eisenhower Order as one test of insecurity. Beyond this, although membership was an act of subordination and faith, many members who paid dues were far less subject to party discipline than others who chose or were instructed not to join. Had Dr. Oppenheimer openly joined the Communist Party and ostentatiously renounced it, his position would be more secure today.

Dr. Oppenheimer holds that like a meteor he passed within the Communist orbit and passed out again. The Commission, in contrast, holds worthy the suspicion that he crashed and remained.

"It is reported," states the Atomic Energy Commission, that Dr. Oppenheimer attended a closed meeting of the Communist Party held in his Berkeley home in 1945. If true, this would cast all his story in doubt.

Who "reported" this meeting? The source of the government's charge is Paul Crouch, on the payroll of the Department of Justice as an "expert witness" at $25 a day. Crouch is a former Communist whose baseless charges and exaggerated language have humiliated and impoverished many devoted government servants. His

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

claims have been disproved; his victims still suffer; his employment by the government continues. After reviewing the record of Crouch's accusations Judge Holtzoff who presided at the trial of Joseph Weinberg declared, "I am amazed that [the Justice Department] should employ him as a member of its staff." When Crouch first made his charge, Dr. Oppenheimer was able to show that he was in fact in New Mexico when Crouch claimed to have been with him in California. Nonetheless Admiral Strauss and President Eisenhower think enough of Crouch to forward his accusation as evidence of disloyalty on the part of one of the nations most distinguished scientists.

The Reply. By his own freely given admission Dr. Oppenheimer drifted close to the Communist Party in prewar years. The central question for those who judge him now is not to which point on the periphery of the party he drifted, but whether he continued his inward course to become a disciplined hard core underground operator, or whether he drifted out again. Here Dr. Oppenheimer's own story must be weighed.

Dr. Oppenheimer's reply is a classic statement of the way in which intellectuals drifted in and out of the Communist spectrum during the thirties. He writes:

> I was almost wholly divorced from the contemporary scene in this country.
>
> I never read a newspaper or a current magazine like *Time* or *Harper's*; I had no radio, no telephone; I learned of the stock market crash in the fall of 1929 only long after the event; the first time I ever voted was in the Presidential election of 1936 . . . I was deeply interested in my science; but I had no understanding of the relations of man to his society. . . .

The world intruded on Dr. Oppenheimer in many ways. First his brother joined the Communist Party and worked for it.

Second, the persecution of the Jews in Germany filled him with "a continuing smoldering fury" and the Spanish Civil War aroused his latent idealism. In the latter case he contributed funds—and through the Communist Party since the Party was active in the Loyalist cause.

Third, through the experiences of his graduate students who went, superbly qualified, into joblessness, he "began to sense the larger sorrows of the great depression" and thus to be driven through guilt and compassion to action

Oppenheimer: The Disciplines of Spirit in the Scientists' World

What are the lessons that the spirit of science teaches us for our practical affairs? Basic to them all is that there may be no barriers to freedom of enquiry. Basic to them all is the ideal of open-mindedness with regard to new knowledge, new experience and new truth. Science is not based on authority. It owes its acceptance and its universality to an appeal to intelligible, communicable evidence that any interested man can evaluate.

There is no place for dogma in science. The scientist is free to ask any question, to doubt any assertion, to seek for any evidence, to correct any error. Where science has been used in the past to erect a new dogmatism, that dogmatism has found itself incompatible with the progress of science; and in the end, the dogma has yielded, or science and freedom have perished together.

Our own political life is predicated on openness. We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to enquire. We know that the wages of secrecy are corruption. We know that in secrecy error, undetected, will flourish and subvert.

Let me be clear. Science is not skepticism. It is not the practice of science to look for things to doubt. It was not by a deliberate attempt of skepticism that physicists were led to doubt the absolute nature of simultaneity, or to recognize that the ideas of strict causality embodied in classical physics could not be applied in the domain of atomic phenomena. There is probably no group of men who take more for granted in their daily work than the scientists. Common sense, and all that flows from it, is their principal basis for what they do in the laboratory and for what they make of it on paper. But for scientists it is not only honorable to doubt, it is mandatory to do that when there appears to be evidence in support of the doubt. In place of authority in science, we have and we need to have only the consensus of informed opinion, only the guide of example. No scientist needs to order his colleagues to use a new technique of experiment or to enter a new field of discovery. If he has done this, it will be an invitation to his fellows to follow.

These then are some of the attitudes of mind, these are some of the disciplines of spirit, that grow naturally in the scientist's world. They have grown there in part as a result of a humane and liberal tradition in political life, and in part as a cause of that. The open mind, the reliance on example and persuasion, rather than on authority—these are the heritage of the centuries in which science has altered the face of the earth. Science can help in diverse ways in preserving and extending this heritage. Its very universality speaks across frontiers to make truth manifest in lands otherwise darkened; its material applications create the pre-conditions—in leisure, in education, in means of communication—for the converse of men with each other. Science provides the material and the intellectual basis for a world in which example and understanding can help all men to improve their lot and fulfill their hopes. Today we need to remember that our country, founded on these practices, and grown strong by their exercise, owes its strength to them. In this time of crisis, we need to cherish that strength.

From an address delivered to the Science Talent Institute in Washington, D. C., March 6, 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a field in which he, unfortunately, lacked perspective.

Last, he shared the scientist's receptivity to new ideas.

Dr. Oppenheimer himself has chosen to ignore this last point, despite its importance in adding to the credibility of the total picture he presents. His reason is that he does not wish to involve the scientific community in his defense. And yet it is involved. Scientists by nature are iconoclasts. They can concede no final truth. They can hold no respect for the opinion of the majority because it happens to be the majority. They cannot yield to prevailing concepts, in the sense noted by Sumner, that "the masses are always patriotic." In another context, Dr. Oppenheimer has argued rightly that science and politics stand at opposite poles. For while political action is meaningless in the absence of moral considerations, "in most scientific study, questions of good and evil, of right and wrong, play at most a minor and secondary part."

Some scientists are drawn to Marxism by its pseudo-scientific approach. Others are drawn by a reaction against science to seek in authoritative doctrines the answers that science cannot provide. No one will attribute these attributions of a mediocre intellect and personality to Dr. Oppenheimer. Whatever he may have said to the brother he loved, the woman he loved, and the friends they loved, his drift away from the Communist world was the logical consequence of a mind that only the highest standards could satisfy.

The War Record Is Challenged. The December 22 letter from the Atomic Energy Commission challenges Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty and conduct on the basis of his wartime record as Director of the Los Alamos Project. It charges that:

He did not want Communists at Los Alamos. (!)

He did not identify former Communists to the Intelligence Officer.

He was responsible for the employment of five scientists who were Communists.

He delayed in informing the FBI that he had been approached indirectly with a view to turning over secrets to Russia.

The immediate comments of Dr. Oppenheimer are that he did not knowingly employ any Communists on secret work; that he informed the Intelligence Officer of the Manhattan District of the man who initiated the approach to him; that he at once rejected the suggestion that he transmit secrets to Russia as "terribly wrong" and that he delayed in reporting the incident because he believed that the friend who served as intermediary was unaware of the significance of his action. This apparently is the incident that stuck in Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's throat. But if this explanation is inadequate, the alternative is scarcely more damaging. It is that while Dr. Oppenheimer's action demonstrated the reality of his break, some weeks were required for him to overcome his distaste for the investigation that his report would precipitate.

More important is Dr. Oppenheimer's argument that the actions cited constitute a fractional part of his wartime record which must be judged as a whole. He conceived the Los Alamos Project; and he organized it. He held it together, under conditions never faced before by scientists. He carried it past "almost paralyzing crises." He drove the men involved day and night, in a race against German scientists who were striving to produce a similar bomb for Hitler, and he won. Without him, according to Dr. Hans Bethe, the bomb would not have been produced. Had Dr. Oppenheimer been working for Germany instead of the United States, the Axis powers and not the Allies might have been victors in the Second World War.

"You Opposed The H-Bomb!" Finally one new charge is levelled that casts doubt on Dr. Oppenheimer's "veracity, conduct and loyalty." It is his opposition to the H-bomb. The Atomic Energy Commission informs Dr. Oppenheimer:

> It was reported that in the autumn of 1949 and subsequently you strongly opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb (1) on moral grounds, (2) by claiming that it was not feasible, (3) by claiming that there were insufficient facilities, and scientific personnel to carry on the development, and (4) that it was not politically desirable.
>
> It was further reported that even after it was determined as a matter of national policy to proceed with development of the hydrogen bomb you continued to oppose the project and declined to co-operate fully in the project. . . .
>
> It was further reported that you were instrumental in persuading other outstanding scientists not to work on the hydrogen bomb project and that the opposition of which you are the most experienced, most powerful and most effective member, has definitely slowed down its development.

This is a truly terrible statement—one of the most terrible we can remember. It reads more like the indictment of Beria by the Kremlin than a document approved by the President of the United States. It stands as an indictment not of Dr. Oppenheimer, but of the President and Admiral Strauss.

The overtones of this charge are plain. In America, as in a totalitarian state, a man is to be tried for opposing a project on moral grounds, and for failing to "co-operate fully" with the state in a project of which he disapproves. In America, as in a totalitarian state, a man who is "experienced," "powerful" and "effective" is to be silenced and immobilized lest he be held responsible for subsequent delays in a vast national enterprise.

Laying aside these appalling assertions, Dr. Oppenheimer is still placed at an intolerable disadvantage. Unconnected fragments are taken from a record of eight years and advanced anonymously to decry a man's loyalty to his country. The defendant cannot cite the record in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his defense because the record, from which these fragments are drawn, is secret.

Dr. Oppenheimer will not lay bare that record to save himself. But if the men who sit in judgment on him gain access to the record, they will find that far from slowing down the H-bomb project, he contributed greatly in bringing it to completion.

The Postwar Record. When Dr. Oppenheimer resigned, on October 16, 1945, as Director of Los Alamos, he left directives for future developments of atomic weapons that served to guide the military for years. He was called back from his university post to help draft the plan for atomic energy control that was adopted by the US and the majority of the UN. He served at the UN, as Consultant to General Osborn. And General Osborn has testified that it was Dr. Oppenheimer who first alerted the American delegation to the Soviet Government's true intentions.

At the end of 1946, Dr. Oppenheimer became Chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. Under his guidance the Commission resisted the return to postwar normalcy and lethargy. The Committee insisted that priority be granted to atomic weapons over atomic power; it backed the expansion of atomic capacity; it called for support of research in basic science; it recommended the wider military use of nuclear energy in submarines, artillery and planes.

Even before work began on the atomic bomb, Dr. Oppenheimer and his associates had considered the hydrogen bomb. Their research on the H-bomb continued throughout the war. No serious controversy arose over the H-bomb until the Autumn of 1949. Then the government learned that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb.

At once the Commission called on the Advisory Committee to advise whether a "crash" program for the development of the H-bomb should be undertaken. The Commission decided unanimously against the "crash" program. It added (with Dr. Oppenheimer concurring), that "an imaginative and concerted attack on the problem has a better than even chance of producing the weapon within five years." Then, in separate annexes to its report, the Commission divided. Enrico Fermi and I. I. Rabi took one position. Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. J. B. Conant, Dr. Cyril Smith, Dr. Lee DuBridge, Hartley Rowe, Vice President and Chief Engineer of the United Fruit Company, and Oliver Buckley, Board Chairman of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, voiced their concern over the political and moral implications of the H-bomb.

Why the Scientists Opposed the H-Bomb

When President Truman issued his directive, 12 of America's leading scientists met to express their shock. They held:

"This bomb is no longer a weapon of war but a means of extermination of whole populations. Its use would be a betrayal of all standards of morality and of Christian civilization itself."

The H-bomb was of course extremely costly and difficult to make. Its effectiveness as a military weapon was challenged by the scientists, whose opinion on the atom bomb the Pentagon had reluctantly followed. Its threat to the United States was appalling, should the American initiative lead the Russians to accelerate their H-bomb research. But above all, the scientists knew that the essence of the H-bomb was that its means defeated its ends. In an eloquent and comprehensive protest, published in April, 1950, in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Hans Bethe, originator of the theory that led to the H-bomb, wrote: ". . . we would lose far more than our lives in a war fought with hydrogen bombs . . . after such a war nothing would remain that resembles present civilization."

This was the conviction that moved Dr. Oppenheimer. He and his fellow scientists voiced their convictions not from lack of patriotism, but from the deepest sense of patriotism. Dr. Oppenheimer declared:

"If we misjudge what this weapon can or cannot do in our hands or in the hands of the enemy we will continue to cause our government on the basis of illusions to follow a course whose only end must be disaster."

Was Opposition Disloyalty? When President Truman ordered the H-bomb, not only the scientists but leading ministers, educators, citizens of all kinds properly expressed their shock and their fear. The present Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy attacked the decision in the House of Representatives and was roundly applauded. Sen. Brien McMahon called, as an alternative, for the most radical offer to Russia of disarmament plus economic aid. Nor were the military, who stirred up the attack on Dr. Oppenheimer, then opposed to him. In Congressional testimony late in 1949, Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, member of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, defined strategic bombing as the bombing of cities. Speaking for "myself and many senior officers of the Navy," he continued:

"We consider that strategic air warfare as practiced

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the past and as proposed for the future is militarily unsound and of limited effect and as morally wrong as it is decidedly harmful for the stability of the postwar world."

In the same spirit, Admiral Arthur W. Radford testified on October 7, 1949, that the armed services had serious misgivings about the increasing acceptance "in some military circles" that:

"We could in the event of war bring a quick, easy, cheap victory based on a bombing blitz."

Dr. Oppenheimer held that the H-bomb was a bad gamble. Admiral Radford told the Congress that its present carrier the B-36 "is a bad gamble . . . useless defensively and inadequate offensively." Dr. Oppenheimer is suspended as a security risk. Admiral Radford is raised by the same Administration to our highest military post—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It may be answered that the charge against Dr. Oppenheimer is not that he opposed the H-bomb, but that he opposed it in the wrong way. That would hardly constitute disloyalty, but where does it lead?

If methods are under review, what of the methods pursued by Admiral Radford in 1949? He participated then in a secret political "task force" to head off and undermine another national decision—to unify the armed forces. Actions were taken in that fight which Dr. Oppenheimer would never have stooped to, lobbying and leaking to the press, spreading slurs on Secretary Johnson and President Truman until General Bradley exploded in anger at the intolerable insubordination of the Naval leaders. An anonymous memorandum, traced to Cedric Worth, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary of the Navy, charged that the B-36 was the product of political corruption connived in by Stuart Symington, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense. The Navy memorandum tied Symington and Johnson to Floyd Odlum of the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation. It implied that it was because Johnson was a director and attorney for Consolidated, and because Odlum contributed to the Democrats, that the B-36 was built.

Did Dr. Oppenheimer "slow down" the H-bomb? In contrast to the action of Admiral Radford and his associates, what did Dr. Oppenheimer do?

The Atomic Energy Commission first presents the allegation that he distributed copies of the 1949 majority and minority reports of his Committee to scientists at Los Alamos. If this was done, it was a proper and normal procedure. It is very doubtful that Dr. Oppenheimer is either responsible for the act, or if responsible, that he is to be blamed.

The Commission next repeats the allegation that Dr. Oppenheimer induced scientists not to work on the H-bomb project. This grave charge he flatly denies. It was true that Dr. Edward Teller, in charge of the project, had difficulty in recruiting scientists for the project. The difficulty arose, as Teller acknowledged in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* from the scientists' general abhorrence of the H-bomb, and of military life.

The third charge is that Dr. Oppenheimer by his general influence "slowed down" the H-bomb. Here secrecy casts its cloak over the events of 1950 and 1951.

A corner of the cloak was lifted when the opponents of Dr. Oppenheimer presented their case in *Fortune* and the *Air Force Journal.* They charged that the Atomic Energy Commission failed to provide full support for the project in 1950 and 1951, and that only when the Air Force threatened to take over the project were the invisible barriers to the H-bomb removed.

This is a partial and distorted account of what happened. The truth is that between the starting point of H-bomb theory and the objective of detonation there were many possible approaches which had to be followed tentatively until they reached dead ends. The initial progress was poor and did lead to pessimism. A critical moment was reached in the Spring of 1951 when Dr. Oppenheimer, as Chairman of the General Advisory Committee, called together the top sicentists to meet with Dr. Teller at Princeton. It was at that meeting that the approach which led to the H-bomb was laid down. If the H-bomb is a blessing, then the nation owes Dr. Oppenheimer not abuse but thanks.

At the same time Dr. Oppenheimer was active in developing other phases of military planning. He and his associates initiated a major effort to demonstrate the feasibility and necessity of defending the United States against atomic attack. And in keeping with his avowed belief that atomic bombs "are not primarily weapons of totality and terror but weapons used to give combat forces help that they would otherwise lack," Dr. Oppenheimer supported a further project to emphasize the development of tactical nuclear weapons.

Both projects were financed by the government. Both were developed by the scientists. If condemnation for "slow downs" is called for, then it is the military who are to be condemned for disregard of these vital areas.

The scientists broke through the barrier of military inertia in Project Charles, Project Vista and the East River Study. At once the Strategic Air Command sensed that these studies threatened the development of retaliatory power. The scientists' thesis that Europe could be held by ground forces, backed by atomic bombs and shells, was taken—wrongly—by SAC as a declaration that strategic bombing was superfluous. The scientists' claim that a major program of continental and civil defense was demanded was further interpreted by SAC as a threat to its share of limited Air Force appropriations. So some Air Force leaders, and scientific advisers moved against the scientists with weapons sharpened in the 1949 battle for the B-36. And because he was the most eloquent spokesman for the scientists, the target became

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The dispute that followed was unnecessary and damaging. It was, of course, cleared up when it was understood by both sides that defense and offense were complementary and not competitive.

In all but the H-bomb, which has not been tested in war, the scientists were proved right. Voicing the SAC view, *Fortune* in 1953 ridiculed the view that defense costing $150 billion or $20 billion was practical or necessary. Now a continental defense program is under way. Similarly Dr. Oppenheimer's insistence on tactical atomic weapons is now accepted by the same Administration which gives him the bums rush from Washington.

Guilty or Not Guilty—of What? This is the tangled story that the Gray board must untangle within a few days. What on earth can it tell Admiral Strauss that he does not know? The prewar data were reviewed by him many times. The new data are taken from minutes of meetings over months at which Strauss himself was present. For Strauss, the assignment was only demanding of courage. He lacked it, and Gray's task is harder.

The Gray board cannot, of course, take Dr. Oppenheimer's word for granted.

It may well be told by one ex-Communist or more that Dr. Oppenheimer said in prewar days—treat me as one of you.

It must assume that many Party members qualified for sensitive work were instructed by the Party in 1940 to repudiate it and to go underground.

It must consider the possibility that Dr. Oppenheimer followed this course—and so opposed the H-bomb out of a continuing association with the Kremlin.

Against this it must weigh the whole record of achievement and expression by one of the world's most gifted and eloquent men.

It is, of course, true that on the basis of evidence far less substantial than that recorded in Dr. Oppenheimer's case, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Americans have been severed from government service.

It is also true that the Russians make no such distinctions in the case of German nuclear physicists as we seek to make now in choosing among Americans.

In the Presidency of Harry Truman the Atomic Energy Commission's criteria for guidance on security matters wisely granted this point. The Commission held:

"The decision as to security clearance is an over-all common sense judgment made after consideration of all the revelant information."

The Commission took the position not only that unfavorable and favorable reports must be balanced in the case of any man, but that "the cost to the program of not having his services" must be balanced "against any possible risks involved."

By this standard, it seems plain, the Gray board would quickly clear Dr. Oppenheimer.

But these are not the standards which prevail today. The Gray board is called on, not to determine whether Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk, but whether he is a security risk *as defined in the Eisenhower Loyalty Order.* The order is so all-inclusive in its definition of doubts, so inflexible in its outlawing of any man against whom a shadow of a doubt can be raised, that it may rule out common sense and reason.

If it is found to disqualify Dr. Oppenheimer, will the country conclude that the Order or Dr. Oppenheimer is at fault?

The scientists, at least, will have no hesitation. One-half of the leading theoretical physicists of the nation were trained by Dr. Oppenheimer. All but a fraction will interpret an attack on him as an attack on science itself; on the political right and professional duty of scientists to hold and to express their doubts. If the raw sludge that passes for evidence, and the Order that makes it law drive the nation's leading scientist from public service, it will take all the persuasive power of Dr. Oppenheimer and his friends to convince the scientists that their obligations to America and the free world remain.

Great issues are raised by the judgment of Dr. Oppenheimer. Like Lincoln he compels a nation to consider not what he was, but what he could become. "What I hoped," he wrote, "was not that I could wholly avoid error but that I might learn from it. What I have learned has, I think, made me more fit to serve my country." Most reasonable men will acknowledge the justice of that statement—in doing so, they repudiate much of the last six years.

Because of his extraordinary gifts, the tortured conscience and maturing consciousness of Dr. Oppenheimer remind us of the old forgotten truth that the right to repent is a part of our heritage, and rests in turn on the willingness to forgive. It was perhaps with faith in that willingness in mind that Dr. Oppenheimer concluded the first of the recent Reith lectures with a quotation from Thomas Jefferson:

> . . . Science can never be retrograde; what is once acquired of real knowledge can never be lost. To preserve the freedom of the human mind then and freedom of the press, every spirit should be ready to devote itself to martyrdom; for as long as we may think as we will, and speak as we think, the condition of man will proceed in improvement. The generation which is going off the stage has deserved well of mankind for the struggles it has made, and for having arrested that course of despotism which had overwhelmed the world for thousands and thousands of years. If there seems to be danger that the ground they have gained will be lost again, that danger comes from the generation your contemporary. But that the enthusiasm which characterizes youth should lift its parricide hands against freedom and science would be such a monstrous phenomenon as I cannot place among possible things in this age and this country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERALD W. JOHNSON: *The Superficial Aspect*

OPPENHEIMER made a bomb and it went off exactly as it was intended to do.

That much we know for a fact—even we outsiders who are not permitted to know anything important about the new weapons know that much. Oppenheimer's work was good; nobody denies it.

Nevertheless Oppenheimer's reputation has been blasted. He has been denied access to any new information, which of course eliminates him from the front rank of nuclear physicists; and he is being subjected to an investigation by a special commission as if he were suspected of being another Benedict Arnold. He is not accused of crime. Nobody says he has done any spying, but the intimation is that he might spy if he were afforded the opportunity.

On the face of it then, the situation is this: Oppenheimer's work was good, but his thoughts were evil.

Obviously, this doesn't apply to all his thoughts. On most subjects Oppenheimer seems to think like everybody else, and we are not yet ready to make the bald assertion that everybody is a scoundrel. Oppenheimer's evil thoughts must be those that are different from the thoughts of the people who have humiliated him. The one subject on which his thoughts differ from those of the powers that be is that of butchering Communists. Oppenheimer is against it. He holds that Communists are people, and that it is better to try to get along with them than to spend all our effort in preparations to massacre them. This is the head and front of his offending.

An observer of the superficial aspect of things is tempted to say that this is an unheard-of attitude for Americans to take, but that is not true. At least once before the policy of forcible suppression of evil thoughts was urged upon the country, with memorable results. It was a hundred years ago and the great advocate of suppression was not McCarthy, but John C. Calhoun.

Almost as many efforts were made to appease Calhoun as have been made to appease McCarthy, but with no more success. Fugitive slave laws were passed and were given more teeth than an army of crocodiles. Missouri was admitted as a slave state. Abolitionist literature was barred from the mails. Every imaginable guarantee against interference with slavery in the South was offered.

But it was not enough. Not content with security against the overt act, Calhoun demanded that agitation of the question be suppressed—that is, that we punish men for evil thoughts.

It is not pleasant to trace the parallel further, for what Calhoun got was the bloodiest war, in proportion to the numbers engaged, of modern times, a war that effected the ruin of his own country. The demand that men be punished, not for their conduct but for their opinions made further conciliation impossible and precipitated catastrophe.

It is logically conceivable, of course, that Oppenheimer is wrong and that Communists are so far from being human that the slightest contact with them attaints and works corruption of the blood. But time was when an American was guaranteed the right to be wrong in his concepts as long as he did nothing to force those concepts on others. As long as his conduct was impeccable, his government had no legal right to molest him, or to subject him to scorn and contumely.

Time was, also, when a man who had served the republic well was regarded as due special consideration from the republic; but today special consideration seems to be reserved to those who amuse the public. Lucille Ball is forgiven for harboring evil, if any, thoughts years ago. But she makes people laugh; Oppenheimer only made the atomic bomb, and what is a great scientist that he should claim to be treated with as much consideration as a comedienne?

So "the swinish cult of anti-intellectualism" goes yak-yaking down the road to a culmination as yet unknown and about which nervous persons prefer not to guess. Their small but multitudinous hooves trample into the dirt men who have performed the most distinguished public services if those men lash them across the snout with contumacious words; and if Thomas Jefferson observes from Olympus he must be quoting his own grim comment: "I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Paris Dispatch: SECRET PRELUDE TO GENEVA

The Geneva conference seems to have an outside chance of being useful if not successful from the Western point of view. One reason is that unlike the Berlin conference it has been prepared in advance by careful, elaborate and quite realistic negotiations, the most important of which have been secret.

Insiders in London and Paris believe that the success or failure of the Geneva conference may depend on where McCarthy stands—or lies—by the time the delegates get down to business. If he still can veto the foreign policy of the US, the conference may scarcely achieve its minimal goal—to get some dependable information about Communist China's intentions and about its relations both with Soviet Russia and with the Viet-Minh. If instead he is no longer in a position to scare the State Department out of even minor, exploratory concessions to Mao Tse-tung, a chain reaction may be started that will lead to a transformation of the situation in Indo-China and then to ratification of the EDC by the French National Assembly.

Success at Geneva means for Premier Laniel and the Foreign Minister getting the Chinese to ditch Ho Chi Minh. They are prepared to risk the burning of their government's boats—every last one of them—on the chance that this can be achieved. If Geneva succeeds in this sense, the Laniel-Bidault team will begin a new and long lease in office by trying to do quickly just what the US Government thinks France should do—ratify the EDC and let General John W. O'Daniel start training a Viet-Namese army which will gradually replace the French forces, letting them return to Europe to balance the new German army's power. If Geneva fails, France may get a neutralist government with all the risks that would entail.



The chance of Red China's giving Ho Chi Minh the "Markos treatment"—the abandonment of the Greek Communist leader by Moscow—is not as remote as it may seem. Since the Berlin conference both Molotov and Malenkov have hinted publicly that Russia badly wants peace in Southeast Asia. Chen Yun of the Chinese Communist Politburo has said that "an era of peace is indispensable for the consolidation of the Chinese revolution." And the suicidal desperation with which Ho Chi Minh's forces have been fighting suggests that he sees the chance of being ditched and would like to avoid it—as Mao Tse-tung not so very long ago avoided the same treatment by Marshal Stalin.

But the most important missing link in the chain reaction that can in the end serve US policy goals both in Europe and Asia is a change in the US attitude toward the Peking regime. When Molotov hinted to Bidault in Geneva that Russia might "under certain conditions" get China to drop Ho, he met with a blunt refusal to pass on the good word to Washington. For the conditions included official US recognition of Peking and even a less astute politician than the Frenchman would have known that this was too much to ask—at present.

But when Bidault hinted to Secretary Dulles that France might consent to "internationalization" of the Indo-Chinese problem—which means share with the US in a new kind of war pointed toward a new kind of peace—he was given a hearing. For the condition in this case—an indication that the US might lift its embargo on trade with Red China—seemed to Dulles to be within the realm of foreseeable political possibilities.

Perhaps more than any other man in France, Bidault is personally responsible for the Indo-Chinese War. It was he who in 1946, when Ho Chi Minh was still more a patriotic nationalist than a Communist, prevented a compromise solution. And it was he who, a few weeks ago, rejected the demand of Pierre Mendes-France for a last attempt at direct negotiations with Ho.

In this rejection, he had the support of the Gaullists. As a matter of fact, the only real difference between Bidault's essentially nationalistic-imperialist notion of France's "world vocation" and General de Gaulle's idea of French "glory and grandeur" is that the one depends on the closest possible connection with the US while the other turns away from the US. Already the US is paying 78¼ percent of the military cost of the Indo-Chinese War. The money comes in dollars to France which pays in francs for supplies, so that the dollars can be used to provide what looks like an improvement in the French financial-economic situation.

If Geneva succeeds, enough of the Gaullists will probably break away from the united anti-EDC front with the Communists to permit the Assembly to ratify. If the conference should fail, however, practically all the parties in France from the far Right to the Communists would find reasons for blaming the Americans. The Left would blame them for having—through Bidault—rejected a deal with Ho whereby the French could get out of Indo-China entirely. And the Right would blame them for not having supplemented the 78¼ percent by American soldiers to back up the Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Senegalese, Madagascans, West Africans and Foreign Legionnaires fighting—under French officers and non-coms, a relatively small proportion of the whole non-Viet-Namese army — to maintain France's glorious world vocation.

So Dulles came to London and Paris to lay the groundwork for "united action" — a NATO-like alliance for Southeast Asia. And although both the English and the French have refused to join him in a warning to China which might have doomed the Geneva conference to ill-tempered haggling, the rumor that a 10-nation alliance will come into being after Geneva is now current and semi-official.

This latest move by Dulles seems an effort simultaneously to provide the West with a strong bargaining position at Geneva—by convincing the Chinese that Indo-China will not be allowed to fall—and to prevent an extreme reaction in France should the conference fail to end or ease the fighting—by making of Indo-China an international rather than a national burden and definitely promising the use of American troops if Viet-Nam cannot otherwise be saved.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

New Novels: Hardbacks or Paperbacks

by Malcolm Cowley

THE BUSINESS of publishing new hard-cover books has been suffering from a mild but prolonged crisis. Essentially the crisis results from high production costs and weakness in the system of distribution. There simply aren't enough bookstores and they don't reach a wide enough segment of the American population. Of recent years their patrons have been saying that books are too expensive, although the increase in price has been less than that of other commodities, including the goods and services that publishers must buy. Many booksellers have reduced their stock and the space devoted to books while introducing some other line of merchandise. In some of the largest department stores, including Macy's, the book department has been exiled to an upper story. There is—to use commercial jargon—a continuing strong demand for nonfiction titles. The demand is appreciably greater than it was before the war, but publishers used to make their profits out of best-selling novels and today there aren't so many of these, nor do their sales reach anything like the wartime figures.

At the same time the public has been buying more copies of many popular novels than at any time in the past. Television and other new forms of mass entertainment haven't destroyed the reading habit, at least not among adults, although they may be doing a more thorough job with children. But instead of going to bookstores the adults have been buying their novels at various types of newsstands and at prices from twenty-five cents for shorter ones to seventy-five cents for a very long book like *From Here to Eternity;* at that price two million copies of *Eternity* were sold in a very few months. It was of course the pocket-size reprint of a novel of which several hundred thousand hard-cover copies had already been sold at $4.50.

Because of the enormous sales of pocket-size books, many persons have asked why all novels—not merely those with a book-store success behind them—couldn't be cheaply printed from manuscript and sold on the newsstands. Isn't this in the spirit of a new civilization bent on distributing the greatest possible number of commodities to the widest possible circle of consumers at the lowest possible prices? Books are the chief cultural commodity. As a step toward making new books more popular, shouldn't other publishers follow the example of Gold Medal, Avon, Ballantine, and the other companies that have been disturbing soft-cover "originals"?

Instead of answering the questions directly, or pleading the Fifth Amendment, I should like to make a few points about the publication and distribution of new books. The first is that the present system, which involves publishers, wholesalers, bookstores, book clubs, and book-review sections—not to mention book printers, binders, jacket designers, illustrators, advertising agencies, indexers, free-lance editorial workers, literary agents, and all the other specialists listed in that valuable handbook, *The Literary Marketplace*—is dependent primarily on the sale of hard-cover books. If the sale collapsed, the system would collapse. Some other system would take its place, since books are a necessity in our culture, but first there would be a period of anarchy during which all the bookish professions would suffer.

There are reasons for doubting that the new system would be better for serious writers—and for the culture as a whole—than the inefficient system that now prevails. Efficiency leads to standardization and doesn't encourage the handicrafts—of which writing is one—or the production of original work except in standardized laboratories. Efficiency would require that there be fewer publishers to issue fewer books in larger quantities and hence at lower prices. Even the soft-cover publishers are inefficient in these respects. There are more than a dozen of them, with the number growing from year to year, whereas it is obvious that two or three really big firms could better exploit the market. The 1,055 soft-cover titles issued in 1953 were possibly twice as many as the newsdealers could effectively display. What shall we then say of the seventy-two trade-publishing houses listed in *The Literary Marketplace,* or of the almost ten thousand new titles they issued that same year? Each house has its own editorial staff and, to some extent, its own notions of literary merit and saleability. House competes with house and book with book in an outrageously inefficient fashion. Yet the system has the advantage for writers and for the public that good manuscripts are eventually accepted by one of the seventy-two houses—if their authors have reason to believe in themselves and have enough pertinacity. Publishers are always being advised to issue fewer books—"and better ones," the adviser is careful to add; but I have noticed that when a publisher shortens his list of forthcoming titles, some of the better manuscripts are usually found to be arty, difficult, or lacking in general appeal and are rejected with the bad ones; the shortest list isn't often the most distinguished.

Among the ten thousand new titles issued by trade-book publishers, some of the best—and a few of the worst—will be reprinted as paperbacks. Others of the best, and thousands that are useful for various reasons, will never be reprinted, but will be available in public libraries. They will also be available, for years, to anyone who orders them through a bookstore. Trade publishers keep their useful books in stock, list them in catalogues, and supply them on demand, so long as an effective demand continues. That too is an inefficient practice from the standpoint of good merchandising, which requires the merchant to get rid of his slow-moving inventory, but it is a useful practice for readers. Some pocket-book publishers follow it with respect to various special series: for example Mentor Books, Anchor Books (issued by Doubleday), and Gold Medal "originals" can be ordered from catalogues. A general rule, however, is that paperbacks are distributed like magazines, in competition with magazines. Having once disappeared from the stands, most of them are as hard to find again as last month's *Ladies Home Journal.*

There is a final point to make that trade-book publishing is a skilled profession as well as a business. It requires a great deal of training, effort, and cap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ital invested in such activities as reading unsolicited manuscripts, finding new authors (often among contributors to little or big magazines), suggesting books they might write (and receiving counter suggestions), helping to support the authors financially and morally until the work is finished, judging the work and often finding ways in which it might be improved, editing copy for the printer, sending advance proofs to critics who might be enthusiastic, designing attractive books (with jackets that truly suggest their contents), writing catalogues and jacket copy that will help to sell them, convincing the booksellers that they can be sold, and then persuading the public, always conservative in its preferences, to read new stories, told in a new manner—if the authors have written that type of stories. Every new book presents a different series of problems. Every new author is a new system of human relationships.

Because of the problems and relationships there is no "best" publisher, any more than there is a best lawyer. Some trade publishers are generally better than others, and there may be a best publisher for some type of book or for an individual author. Sometimes an author receives a disproportionate share of editorial attention, which his work may justify in the end. The editorial staff of Scribners worked for years with James Jones before *From Here to Eternity* was ready for the printer; then the sales and promotion staff worked for months with the book before bound copies were placed on sale. The late Maxwell Perkins, of Scribners, had worked still longer with Thomas Wolfe, as Jones had heard; the younger novelist greatly admired Wolfe and that was one reason for his choice of publisher.

If he had finished *Eternity*, which was his first book, without editorial advice it would have been a less effective novel. If it had been submitted to any publisher of soft-cover "originals" —except possibly Ballantine—it would have been rejected merely for its length, or else might have been reduced to one-third the length by omitting all but the more sensational and sexy passages. The pocket-book publishers, with their smaller margin of profit, simply cannot afford to spend much time on professional activities and human relationships. Neither can they afford to plan sales strategies for an individual author—unless he approaches the popularity of Mickey Spillane—or to make advertising appropriations for separate novels. They are engaged in the business of mass distribution and they have to find products for which there is an actual or easily stimulated mass demand. Usually the products are books that have previously been edited and promoted by a trade publisher.

This is the first of two articles by Mr. Cowley on soft-cover "originals."—THE EDITORS.

Birth of a Nation

IT IS SAFE to say that the intellectual setting in which for forty years or more we did our thinking about the Founding Fathers has by now undergone something of a change. One realizes today that "debunking" the Federalists — which was exciting for twenty years and respectable for another twenty—has become almost quaintly old-fashioned; rebelling against our grandparents' "naïve" conception of the Fathers no longer has the urgency for us that it had for our parents. We have, to be sure, absorbed all the *caveats* of Progressive and post-Progressive writers—their picture, that is, of the Federalists as counter-revolutionary manipulators working to guarantee the rights of property, or at best as patricians decidedly cool to "democracy." But we have also begun to discover that the most noteworthy feature of the Fathers' political attitudes was that the most enlightened men of the day shared them, and that the one supreme thing upon which Federalists and anti-Federalists alike resoundingly agreed was the rights of property. Their "struggle," in short, was anything but a "class" affair; it was not even primarily a matter of principle. The secrets which Beard, Smith, Parrington, and Bowers have really told us, it appears, concern plots connived at by one and all, conspiracies to which the entire nation was a party.

The Founding Fathers, by Nathan Schachner (Putnam; $6).

There has been a new willingness to appraise the true contributions of the Federalists. Mr. Leonard White, with his valuable monograph a few years ago on the Federalists' administrative problems, did much to set this in motion. It is in the new objective spirit, writing under few of the compulsions of the past, that Mr. Nathan Schachner now offers us his *Founding Fathers.*

Carrying the picture from Washington's inauguration to that of Jefferson, Mr. Schachner allows us to balance the assets and liabilities of the Federalists. There is a kind of monumental obviousness about the assets: an aggregation of the best talent, learning, and character available in the country—a group of men whose accomplishments in office mount higher in substantive bulk than those of any regime that ever followed them. Their inevitable liability lay in their very firstness. All the initial decisions had to be taken by them.

It fell to the Fathers to make all new; theirs was the stupefying task of setting up the government. The great matter at stake for Washington was making a nation of what had been a loose coalition, and his initial problem was to fill the offices with the best men he could find. Two of them were men of genius. Mr. Schachner is not tempted to identify the Jefferson-Hamilton conflict with the universal dichotomies of man's nature, but notes, with cool detachment, the vices and virtues of Washington's two chief cabinet officers contending for primacy within the official circle. Behind it was the President's grim determination to retain them both, and to keep their clashing temperaments from threatening the stability of his government. Again and again he deplored "faction" and "the spirit of party."

Not only did the Fathers, as Founders, have to establish a government, but as they set it in motion it was necessary at every step to consider the crucial problem of precedents for the future. The heads of departments, though Washington gave them much latitude and abided by majority decisions, were not to be ministers of state but assistants to the President. Washington, moreover, would be responsible for all their acts. And something had to be done about each agonizing detail of protocol and etiquette—what should the President be called—how many levees should he give—how should everyone behave? The twin dilemma of legitimacy involved discovering the proper tone for a republic and at the same time recognizing that the masses, as any man of the eighteenth century understood, had to be impressed. John Adams, as president of the Senate, was unlucky enough to have to ask many of the first questions. For his pains, this austere New

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

England republican was dubbed a friend of aristocratic frippery.

With Hamilton's funding system, his national bank, his sinking fund, his tax system, and his mint, the national credit was established with a soundness compelling the respect of the entire world. The opposition was never so basic as to prevent the program from being enacted *in toto*. Jefferson, to be sure, opposed the bank (though he knew nothing of banks); yet he himself was quite willing to bargain with Hamilton for his support of the latters assumption plan.

In foreign affairs the Fathers achieved what for the America of the 1790s was virtually the ultimate: staying out of war. Mr. Schachner notes with equal distaste Hamilton's undercutting of the Jay mission to England as well as Jefferson's quite unreasonable pro-French attitude. Even the Alien and Sedition Acts, considered in terms both of setting and consequences, involved something less than a reign of terror. Washington had taken as much scurrility from Freneau and Bache as a man of honor could stand, and the bedeviled Adams, in endorsing potential tyranny, had very little precedent for suppressing "faction" at a time of crisis. Yet though a grievous political error, the Acts caused no blood to flow, pathetically few were even jailed in consequence, and the unfortunates were all shortly released. John Adams, vacating the field to Jefferson after having defied the extremists of his own party and rescued his country from a war with France, paid the highest price that could have been exacted of him. The value he set on his own services was never quite matched with what he valued most—the esteem of his fellow citizens.

Though Mr. Schachner himself offers few "conclusions," the very uncommitted lucidity of his story is an encouragement to draw a few of one's own. The Federalists made no fundamental mistakes—except one. The one iron necessity which they, as the *first* government, were predestined to overlook was that of producing a politician. Yet to the Jeffersonians, their great service and function was to define by example and error the limits of the possible with respect to *tone*. The differences between them went little deeper than that, but with the basic problems solved and the crucial first decisions made, this became everything. From here on, the deepest cleavage between our parties—except for 1860—would be the gulf between the ins and the outs: the question of who would run the government and a ceremonial vocabulary sufficiently abstract to organize a majority. Jefferson, thwarted and outmaneuvered by his chief rival in the cabinet, resenting the pretensions of Hamilton (an *arriviste* and man of no family), was the logical man to rally the outs. Consider all that he and Madison were allowed to learn in those twelve years. Jefferson had been in France, and instinct told him that Philadelphia could be no Versailles; he might watch the Federalists' experiments with etiquette and show, and could sense where they fell off key; neither Washington's stiffness nor the ostentation of the Binghams was quite the style for impressing the rabble. Jefferson, the hereditary gentleman, had the aristocrat's sensitivity for finding just the proper note. His levees would be more brilliant than ever, he would spend twice as much on them as Adams had, but with a difference: they would be *informal*. And the British minister would be received in carpet slippers. Amid all this it would be quite appropriate to exhort the party against a resurgence of "aristocracy," though no one dreamed of campaigning as an aristocrat.

Nor did Jefferson and Madison actually, on a *concrete* plane, rally the "agrarians" in a struggle against the "jobbing interests," any more than Mr. Truman did in 1948. Nor was this their intention. Again, it was a matter of tone. With the country overwhelmingly agricultural, it would be political folly not to appropriate rural folklore about bankers and merchants with which to club the opposition on ceremonial occasions—even though in actual consequence Hamilton's system would undergo virtually no alteration. And Hamilton's tax policy made sense to most people, including Jefferson and Madison—until they heard what the farmers of Pennsylvania had to say about the excise. Given the cue they might, when Jefferson came to power, repeal it with a flourish. *Their* keynote would be "frugality"; flooded with tariff receipts, they could well afford it.

The Federalists' manifest function was to manage our debut as a nation, to solve its first concrete problems, and to give content to all our basic political institutions except one. Their *latent* function was to furnish political instruction to their successors and permit them to discover the techniques and rhetoric of opposition. It was thus that "faction," which they so abhorred, was institutionalized, made marginal, stable, and safe, and became the true conservative force in our national politics.

ERIC L. MCKITRICK


"In collaboration these authors have produced a better book than either ever wrote singly."
—STERLING NORTH
A wonderful new book by
THE OVERSTREETS
"An encouraging and optimistic look at ourselves . . . They not only tell us what we must do but they show us how . . . with a modesty and conviction that makes us want to try."
—Saturday Review
Out of THE MATURE MIND comes
$3.75 at all bookstores
HARRY and BONARO OVERSTREET
THE Mind Alive
6th Big Printing
NORTON

Soldier President

ALTHOUGH it is the first title in the Library of American Biography that Oscar Handlin is editing for Little, Brown, this is not a biography; but it fails in the same way that Voltaire's "History of Charles XII" fails to be a biography, that is to say, it is a study of a phenomenon rather than the re-creation of an individual.

U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition, by Bruce Catton (Little, Brown; $3).

Nevertheless I admit, in defiance of the pundits, that I would not swap the Frenchman's *tour de force* for a hundredweight of average biographies; and while I cannot equate Mr. Catton with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Voltaire, I do believe that his small volume outweighs, well, let us say twenty–five pounds of run-of-the-mines lives. In one respect, indeed, it is a minor miracle, for it is a book about General Grant and I think a truthful book, yet it sparkles. To write both truthfully and sparklingly about U. S. Grant takes an artist, not to say a wizard.

Perhaps, though, it owes something of its effect to the moment of its appearance, as a landscape picks up magic in the sunset's afterglow. For this is the story of a fine soldier and a true patriot inveigled by wily politicians into taking a job which he did not understand and for which he had no natural talent. He turned to the wrong advisers as, considering his experience, he was almost bound to turn. He picked a good Secretary of State, but he loaded his Cabinet with big business men, most of whom had no more understanding of the art of government than he had; and he allowed very dubious characters to attach themselves like barnacles to his administration.

The result was tragedy for the nation and for the man. It was not so much the stealing, for what the outright thieves got away with was a mere pinprick; the deep, long-festering wound was the degradation of government when it accepted the acquisitive instinct as the measure of the worth of a man. The heresy that a moneyed man is a meritorious man was the deep damnation of the Grant administration, by comparison with which the lurid scandals were inconsequential.

Catton, indeed, has a lordly disdain for scandal. Belknap, the crooked Secretary of War, gets one line in this history and Babcock is given attention not for his grafting with the Whiskey Ring but on account of his connection with the San Domingo affair. But this serves to drive home the chilling truth that it is not necessary for an administration to be grossly corrupt in order to be ruinous. Mere incompetence may cost more than rascality.

This is the significance of the book for our time, but it is by no means its only merit. The whole Civil War gets just 75 pages with two passing references to Gettysburg; but when you have read those pages you know how the Confederacy was beaten. The rest, after all, is detail of interest chiefly to students of military history; the hugely important factor was the reciprocal action of Grant and Sherman, nullifying the brilliance of Lee and Joseph E. Johnston—total war wrecking and destroying the Paladins.

Catton is convinced that Grant was at his most magnificent in the last two years of his life when in the ruin of all his hopes and doomed to an agonizing death from cancer of the throat, he set out to provide for his family by writing the Memoirs, finished just 48 hours before his death. The average reader will gladly agree. There is a lift of the spirit in the realization that this man, who first saved his country by doing what he was supremely competent to do, and then all but ruined it by accepting an office for which he was incompetent, ended by furnishing all future generations with an example of courage so magnificent that it puts to shame Richard and Raymond and Bayard.

An excellent soldier, a hopelessly bad President, yet in the end superb—what a lesson for all generations! Yet one hears the sardonic words of old Hegel still echoing: all that we learn from history is that nations learn nothing from history. GERALD W. JOHNSON

Economics & Ethics

IN the authors' own words, "Essentially this is a declaration that economics and religion cannot be kept in watertight compartments, as in the recent past many would have separated these elements of man's activity." *Ethics in a Business Society* is, in a sense, both product of and introduction to a six volume series on the Ethics and Economics of Society which constitutes the report of a study, originated some years ago, by the Federal Council of Churches. The authors stated that this series stimulated their present work; their book impels me to read the series.

Ethics in a Business Society, by Marquis W. Childs and Douglas Cater (Harper; $2.75).

But in itself this small volume is important simply because it is a thoughtful and careful attempt to come to grips with the world's great problem: technology and organization enable us to produce an abundance of material things; will the complexities of our industrial society confound us? Will fear enslave us and conformity destroy us? Will we eliminate the means of abundant production and our own lives by the tens of millions through misuse of our most incredible technological achievement? Or can we use our abundance to serve justice and freedom?

Childs and Cater do not give us a simple, happy answer. There is none. But they do render an important service because they help us to rediscover the perilous place in which we find ourselves and the confused and careless way by which we got there. They conclude and I agree, "In this is the beginning of hope." RICHARD BOLLING

Notes on the Critics

MALCOLM COWLEY is at work on a new book of critical essays. ERIC L. MCKITRICK is on the History faculty of Columbia University. RICHARD BOLLING is a Democratic Congressman from Missouri. WALTER GOODMAN writes extensively on American and British radio and TV.

RECENT BOOKS

"The World's Next Great Religion."—Julian Huxley

HUMANISM
AS THE NEXT STEP
By Lloyd and Mary Morain

This book not only sets forth the basic ideas of Humanism, but applies the Humanist philosophy to today's problems of personal needs and emotional security. It is the only popular, authoritative book available on what many call the most fitting religion for the 20th century.

At your bookstore, $2.00
THE BEACON PRESS, Boston 8

Just Published

THE DEEP TRUTH: A Study of Shelley's Scepticism
By C. E. Pulos

A vindication of Shelley's intellectual consistency, showing the importance of the sceptical tradition as the logical center of his philosophy.

University of Nebraska Press, $2.75

Luigi Pirandello's

RIGHT YOU ARE

A STAGE VERSION WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

ERIC BENTLEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
NEW YORK 27 **$4.00**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RADIO—TV

IF TELEVISION has not been with us long enough to make clear just what changes it will wreak upon the country, cultural, educational, entertainment-wise, it has, by the very fact of its existence, already cast a pall over the once shining spirits of radio. As the dusk deepens for the former champions, they will find themselves among the first to change, growing thin, pale, and bent as they scrabble for a niche, however modest, in the life of a nation of TV-viewers.

American radio stretches across the country today like some languishing behemoth in the aftermath of a terrible onslaught. The young giant has breathed furiously upon its mother and passed on, carrying all in its wake—audience followed by sponsors followed by talent. The audience, fickle, entertainment-loving, has found in television everything it found in radio plus an ever-widening screen with pictures on it. The sponsors, without compassion for the medium they have exploited so profitably for so long, have planted their seed in fresh land. And the stars, writers, directors, that well-fed, unnatural brood, have hastened after to the dollar-green fields.

Network time salesmen can still be heard now and then calling out to fled sponsors—of the buyer in his automobile, the shopper at her housework, of the millions of radio sets in TV-less homes all over the United States. But their cries are more from habit than from hope and no one will listen because no one really cares.

In their heyday the broadcasters made full use of the truths they had learned so well in their prodigy years: that personality and not substance draws the highest Hoopers; that Sunday afternoon is the proper hour for serious music; that only talks people will tune in are those delivered by politicians or preachers; that adaptations of Hollywood movies can be passed off as radio drama; that sponsors freeze at the thought of controversy.

Radio in America has thrived on doing what television can do much better. The big-name variety shows, the husband-and-wife situation comedies, the mysteries, the quiz programs, the news reportage, even the daily soap opera anguish can be more effectively relayed by picture. And there is no new dimension for the old medium to discover. Radio is stuck inextricably in a Cinemascopeless world, in an age before the wonders of Cinerama and Stereophonic sound—even before Technicolor. And as TV's kinks are ironed out, as more sets are sold, radio's boosters will get hoarser and hoarser and find fewer and fewer nation-wide buyers.

But in this financial catastrophe of sound broadcasting lies the hope of a new approach by radio to its function and place in a TV age. Unable any longer to reap the once juicy fruits of network shows, local stations may find sustenance in their own communities, selling to small businessmen and home town organizations programs directed at 100,000 buyers instead of at 100 million.

Unable to compete in the big-time entertainment circuit, radio may look into its own potentialities for the things it can do better than other media but has never had to do before. Hooper ratings have lost their charm, radio will be able to direct its appeal to more limited but more particular audiences. The ingredients: music of all sorts, technically superior and intelligently varied, with fewer interruptions for commercials; talks on subjects which a medium catering to mass audience whims could never dare to touch; imaginatively conceived dramatic shows, written to be heard, not seen; prose and poetry readings by ugly or camera shy actors.

None of these will turn radio into a real competitor of TV for the smile of the advertising agencies. That fight is already lost, and the sooner radio's executives admit this the better. Their job now is to do what television, fresh slave of the hundred and fifty million, is incapable of doing, to accept the smaller returns and use their new freedom to fit radio into a place where it will not be troubled by competition. There is such a place, unfilled for too long.

If this encourages a different kind of radio station financing—by subscription or contribution—that's all to the good. If we are lucky, radio's bright young men—or what remains of them—may learn why no cobwebs will form around the radio sets of listeners to Britain's Third Programme, commercial TV or no commercial TV.

As for television itself, the current king is meeting its recently inherited responsibilities by offering many popular performers interrupted by many less popular commercials. A recent week of viewing by a statistically minded University of Illinois group yielded the following data: Advertising took up 18 percent of program time; there were 6.2 instances of violence per hour (36.6 per hour on kiddies' programs); news reportage, general information shows, and special events and features—TV's forte if there ever was one—put together chalked up under seven percent of the total on-the-air time. With 3,421 acts and threats of bloodshed a week, the advent of color TV promises to send a blush of crimson across the country.

The Ford Foundation has given us "Omnibus," for which everyone is duly grateful. Edward R. Murrow is setting a high standard of interpretive newscasting. There are a number of other bright spots. But on the whole television has reached into radio, emerged with all the old formats, adapted them slightly, and is making several fortunes with the same potpourri that has had educators gnashing their teeth and the educated lifting their noses.

Possessing inherently the magic power to keep children seated and watching almost anybody doing almost anything for hours at a stretch, TV is nourishing them on Howdy Doodie, Hopalong Cassidy, and old westerns. For every play it presents that could rate a New Haven tryout, it tosses in dozens of routine mysteries, cut-to-pattern melodramas, and saccharine domestic comedies. The one or two essentially television comedians it has spawned must share the limelight with all the others telling their old gags and taking their older prattfalls. The quiz shows and the programs designed to pull at your heartstrings grow increasingly complicated and increasingly sloppy.

But criticisms like these have all been made many times. Madison Avenue remains what it has always been. Network producers speak only to account executives; the hucksters speak only to sponsors; and sponsors don't speak at all, they read sales charts. For the audience there is condescension and not a little awe, but no respect and no responsibility. Rich and growing richer, television may be expected to carry on the dubious traditions of these forbears, to ride the safe paths marked out and ridden so prosperously by them—at least until another medium comes along.

WALTER GOODMAN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

► French Policy in Indo-China

May I, as a former Paris correspondent of the Labour *London Daily Herald* take issue with you over one or two points in your preface to Graham Greene's report from Indo-China? (*Behind the Headlines*, April 5). There has, of course, been some extraordinarily stupid behavior on the French side in Indo-China, but I do not think they should be allowed to take the blame for everything.

To begin with, it is so far from true that 1945 saw Indo-China neatly divided into "a collaborationist movement . . . presided over by the French and a Viet-Namese resistance movement led by Ho Chi Minh" that Ho would never have been able to set up his government in Hanoi had it not been for a foolhardy French resistance putsch. If I may quote from my own *Death of the Fourth Republic*, just published in London, "the structure of the French administration might have remained untouched till Hiroshima had not the garrison, sick at the prospect of an eventual passive liberation by the Americans or the British, and long in touch with emissaries of Mountbatten and de Gaulle, prepared a revolt against the Japanese with such utter indiscretion that the occupants struck first and arrested every French soldier and administrator in the country on March 9, 1945. Thus, when Japan's sun set, the French troops, behind their bars, could do nothing to prevent Ho Chi Minh from proclaiming . . . the independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam."

The fact that the reaction of the Americans on the spot was to pat the Democratic Republic on the head and to rap the French over the knuckles had a doubly unfortunate effect. It emboldened the nationalists into raising their price; it provoked the local representatives of France to dig their toes in. For it was not "France" which "cut up the contract she had signed" with the Viet-Namese on March 6, 1946. It was Admiral Thierry's d'Argenlieu in Saigon who proclaimed the Republic of Cochin-China behind the backs of the Cabinet, and American behavior of the kind complained of by M. Sainteny could only encourage him in his intransigent adherence to colonialism.

Finally, any American view that in 1946 "France rather than the Viet-Minh [had] elected for violence" can only have been based on a selection from the facts so narrow as to be valueless. The Cabinet in Paris certainly did not want trouble: one-third of its Ministers were Communists and there was a Socialist at the Colonial Ministry. Some of the men on the spot may indeed have wanted a showdown, but they were by no means all of that mind: General Leclerc insisted that almost any sacrifice must be made to prevent Ho Chi Minh from resorting to violence, since once he had taken to the jungle, he would never be defeated. And it was not the French who fired first at Haiphong.

It is probably true that the French could have avoided the war in 1946 and could have settled it in 1947, but had they done either it would have been despite of, not because of the American attitude.

RONALD MATTHEWS

Birmingham, England

► Strout and Escapism in Art

I wish to take exception to Mr. Strout's ridiculous digression about "escapism . . . already visible in the arts." I won't presume to defend Joyce, or even Gertrude Stein, but I vehemently deny that Joyce ever, or Stein ever except for a few joking occasions, is *obscurantist*, though they are sometimes obscure, especially to their unreader. (Less persistently obscure, by the way, under careful examination, than politics, by his serious application to which Mr. Strout has, evidently, learned *something*.) As for art, neither Dada nor Surrealism has been a living movement in painting for years, and, again, by his reference to them, in capital letters, as if they were, Mr. Strout reveals his readiness to condemn what he has not even looked at.

BERNARD HERINGMAN

Missoula, Montana

• • •

It is possible that Richard L. Strout, "veteran Washington news correspondent," knows . . . politics. But when he drops over for an incompetent paragraph into talk about art, he assembles his material like McCarthy documenting the simplified history of Marxist-Communism. He dismisses two generations of assorted poets by citing odd habits of a few disparate specialists, "some of whom omit capital letters and punctuation." The assumption that poetry requires capital letters—some poets have made a specialty of them — and that poetic punctuation depends on copybook punctuation—academic vulgarians in another century corrected Shakespeare's—shows that Mr. Strout is more capable of stuff and nonsense than of literature.

May I suggest that the *New Republic* . . . reject from political discussion any pettifogger who tries to emphasize his points on one subject by displaying his incompetence in what he believes to be the common ignorance of another.

PETER YATES

Los Angeles, California

► Praise for Critics

It's remarkable that one magazine, *The New Republic*, has been able to obtain the best theatre reviewers of the generation: Stark Young, Harold Clurman, and, best of all, Eric Bentley. Mr. Bentley's articles are more trenchant and exciting than most of the productions he has to review.

HARRY G. MCGIRT

Wilmington, North Carolina

• • •

I consider "Irrational Elements in Art and Politics" by Lewis Mumford by far the best critical essay that has appeared in the *New Republic* since I have become a subscriber.

WALTER GERSTEL

Berkeley, California

CLASSIFIED

WIN CONTEST MONEY. General Contest Bulletin gives hundreds of tips. Lists current contests, rules. Sample 25c. General Contests, 1609 East 5th, Dept. 339, Duluth, Minn.

SHALL WE SIT IDLY BY?—lead article on how communication among neighbors combats urban blight in current issue of ETC., official journal of Int'l Society for General Semantics, edited by S. I. Hayakawa. Read how language forms limit thought, behavior. $4 a year; trial issue $1. Write Dept. 22, 400 W. North Ave., Chicago 10, Ill.

42 Addresses of U.S. Presidents, from G. Washington to Eisenhower, 249 pp, 5⅞ x 9⅛. Price $1.50. Guaranteed. Order from, American, 6418 S Whipple, Chicago 29, Ill.

BULLFIGHT POSTERS!

Authentic full-color Bullfight Posters, printed in Spain: from Plaza de Toros de Madrid, Granada, Seville, y Valencia. Featuring Spain's most renowned matadors: Manolete, Bienvenida and others. Printed in vivid colors with complete description in Spanish of matadors, dates, bulls. Genuine collectors' items; ideal for den, patio, bar. Each 21" x 40".

2 for $3.00 ppd; complete set of four, $4.00 ppd.
Complete satisfaction guaranteed. Order from Importer:
MANUEL MEJIAS ANDALUZ
29 Sixteenth Avenue, San Francisco, Calif.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Some people need a nice cold shower . . .

If you have friends, (or relatives) who've forgotten the tingle of new ideas, the stimulation of unorthodox opinions, it's time they started a brisk course of NEW REPUBLIC! Most people with brains enjoy the weekly cold-shower wake-up of NR. That's why this magazine makes such a fine gift!

26 Cold Showers — only $2.98!

NEW REPUBLIC, 1826 Jefferson Pl. NW, Washington 6, D. C.

Please send the next 26 weeks of NR to

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ ZONE____ STATE_____

Sender's Name_____

The Charles C. Sherrod Library
TENNESSEE STATE COLLEGE
Johnson City, Tennessee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED